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Double-breasting voice systems: an assessment of motives, arrangements and durability 
 
Abstract 
This article explores employee voice within the specific institutional arrangement of double-
breasting. Double-breasting is when multi-plant organisations recognise trade unions in 
some company sites, with non-union arrangements at other company plants, or where a 
unionised firm acquires a new site that it then operates on a non-union basis. We examine 
three research questions in four separate case study organisations that operate such double-
breasting arrangements across 16 workplace locations on the island of Ireland. These 
questions consider employer motives for double-breasting, the practices that characterise 
double-breasting voice, and the micro-political implications of double-breasting. The article 
contributes to knowledge on the emergence and impact of double-breasting. We subsequently 
advance two theoretical propositions: the first theorising employer motives for double-
breasting, and the second explaining the extent to which the practice of double-breasting is 
durable over time. 
 
Keywords:  double-breasting, employee voice, union avoidance 
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Introduction 
Employer motives for employee voice systems are of growing importance to academics, 
practitioners and policy advisors (Wilkinson et al., 2010). Employee voice systems are 
typically regarded as incorporating a variety of workplace structures and processes which 
enable, and at times empower, employees directly and indirectly to contribute to decision-
making in the firm (Boxall and Purcell, 2003: 162). As union membership has declined 
across most industrialised economies, a multiform system of voice has emerged to replace or 
sit alongside traditional trade union channels (Marchington et al., 1993, 2001; Wilkinson et 
al., 2004). In recent years, employer strategies for employee voice have been studied in the 
context of examining multiple channels (or ‘bundles’) of practices, either within a single 
enterprise or set of firms, or extrapolating inference from large data sets (Kersley et al., 2006; 
Bryson et al., 2013; van Wanrooy et al., 2013). Evidence points to significant patterns in 
‘hybrid’ voice regimes, where non-union channels co-exist with union forms of 
representation, or situations in which firms operate non-union systems as a ‘substitute’ for 
union voice (Willman et al., 2006; Dundon and Gollan, 2007; Campolieti et al., 2013). A 
related emerging phenomenon is the parallel use of union and non-union mechanisms known 
as ‘double-breasting’: that is the situation when a multi-plant organisation recognises trade 
unions in some of its company locations, while also implementing non-union arrangements at 
other company plants, or where a unionised firm acquires a new site that it consciously 
operates on a non-union basis (Gunnigle et al., 2005:250). Crucially, it is distinct from hybrid 
or dual union and non-union regimes in that the focus is not on comparative practices within 
sites, but rather union status across individual sites within the same company.  
A series of recent studies indicate an increasing propensity amongst multinational 
companies (MNCs) in particular to adopt double-breasting arrangements (Lamare et al., 
2013; Gunnigle et al., 2009; Marginson et al., 2010). In a comparative sample of 405 
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unionised MNCs operating across Canada, Ireland and the UK, Lamare et al., (2013) found 
that 84 percent of firms in Canada, 70 percent in Britain and 50 percent in Ireland had 
adopted double-breasting in recent years. Similarly, a study by Marginson et al. (2010: 15) 
revealed a “discernible trend” in double-breasting amongst multinationals in Britain. For 
example, of 60 MNCs which both recognised unions at existing plants and had opened new 
sites in the previous three years, just 18 percent had recognised unions at the new locations 
whilst 42 percent had not recognised unions. In Ireland, Gunnigle et al. (2009) found that of 
53 MNCs that reported the establishment of a new site over the previous five years, 49 
percent engaged in double breasting. 
In this article, we address three research questions that remain largely unexplored in the 
literature on double-breasting. The first question concerns employer motives for 
implementing double-breasting voice and contributes to knowledge on how and why double-
breasting emerges. The second question seeks to unpack the nature of the arrangements 
which double-breasted firms use.  Our study moves beyond the existing research, which has 
simply charted the phenomenon to-date by noting the existence, or absence, of union status 
across different sites. The third research question is interested in the impact and potential 
‘durability’ of double-breasting over time and space. This refers to the ‘micro-politics’ of 
double-breasting and how practices are played out at firm level, whether the double-breasting 
arrangement is contested or not and the implications for employees and trade unions. 
Crucially, these questions require a methodological design capable of capturing actor intent, 
especially employer motives and worker and union reactions, in order to better explain 
phenomena (Ferner et al. 2011:182). In this regard, this study uses a qualitative comparative 
case study design, based on sixteen workplace units of analysis in four separate organisations 
with operations on the island of Ireland. 
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The structure of this article is as follows:  we begin by reviewing the literature on double-
breasting, raising three questions that require empirical investigation. A description of the 
research approach and the suitability of the case study organisations to address the research 
questions follow. The article then presents the findings from the case studies.  The final 
section discusses the findings and advances two theoretical propositions generalised from the 
findings to further knowledge and understanding of double-breasting.  
 
Double-breasting: theoretical considerations and key issues 
The phenomenon of double-breasting refers to the simultaneous use of trade union 
recognition in some company plants and non-union arrangements in other company locations 
(Gunnigle et al., 2005). It is distinct from hybrid or dual union and non-union regimes in that 
the focus is not on comparative practices within sites, but rather across sites within the same 
company. The core of the approach means unionised workers have independent collective 
voice, while employees in non-union sites do not.  
Early conceptualisations of double-breasting treated it as a strategic choice, or as evidence 
of ‘deliberate sequentiality’ on the part of the employer, to avoid unionised wage premiums 
and terms and conditions by deploying non-union arrangements in newly-acquired business 
units (Lipskey and Farber, 1976; Ruben, 1985; Rose, 1986; Verma and Kochan, 1985; 
Northrup, 1995).  The approach was sometimes cast as ‘whipsawing’: a situation in which 
management would play off (unionised) workers at one company plant in relation to another 
(non-union) site or location. The aim was to attain lower labour costs by strategically 
separating union and non-union operations, with the explicit objective of removing the union 
wage mark-up in favour of lower costs at unorganised locations (Allen, 1995). Northrup 
(1995: 381), for example, proposed that in contrast to the union wage premium, higher fringe 
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benefit costs, less flexibility and alleged productivity gap, “the cost advantages of open-shop 
contractors made double-breasting a rational alternative for many union contractors”. This 
form of anti-unionism is, as Dundon and Gall (2013: 1) note, “a conscious, deliberate 
decision to undermine and erode hypothetical, potential and actual workplace collective 
union organisation” that may operate along the suppression-substitution modus operandi. 
Presented as a possible ‘deliberate strategy’, double-breasting may entail managers 
whipsawing employees in unionised sites to accept concessions to their terms and conditions 
(Cimini et al., 1993; Dooley, 1994). However, a noticeable gap in understanding is that the 
potential for and even the extent of such practices remains relatively unexplored in empirical 
terms.  
Later contributions to the double-breasting literature distinguish between those forms of 
double-breasting which arose from the opening of union-free ‘greenfield sites’, and those 
which emanated as ‘brownfield sites’ through the acquisition of other firms with established 
non-union status (Beaumont, 1985; 1987; Beaumont and Townley, 1985; Beaumont and 
Harris, 1992). Double-breasting in this context is interpreted differently to reflect a practice 
where “a multi-establishment organization may simultaneously operate establishments on 
both a union and non-union basis” (Beaumont and Harris, 1992: 268). The assumption of any 
deliberate intentionality is removed with the motivation left open-ended. As Lamare et al. 
(2013) observe, double-breasting may arise as a legacy of site acquisition or the different 
organising activities of workforces at various sites. It may therefore mirror dissimilarities 
between sites that are wholly white-collar and those where blue-collar workers dominate; or, 
as in federal systems like Canada, with split jurisdictions over employment regulation it may 
reflect within-country variation in labour law. In this interpretation, double-breasting arises 
from a conflux of factors that may, or may not, be related to sidestepping unionisation.  This 
also complements a wider viewpoint within the literature which recognises that the idea of a 
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simple or single model of employer choice in relation to employee voice may not be 
straightforward (Marchington et al., 2001; Dundon et al., 2004). A number of factors may 
impinge on employer options regarding the choice of voice: for example certain regulatory 
rules, laws, product market circumstances or custom and practice among employees 
themselves may encourage certain behaviours that would otherwise not occur (Beaumont and 
Hunter, 2003).  
Despite the two streams of conceptualisation, the double-breasting literature has been 
relatively silent in unveiling the empirical rationales offered by employers as to why double-
breasting exists. In one of the very few qualitative studies on double-breasting motives, 
Gunnigle et al. (2009) outlined how American MNCs often justified double-breasting on the 
basis of three arguments. First, management felt going non-union would allow them greater 
freedom in making and implementing operational decisions. Second, management argued that 
these new sites employed younger, better educated workers who were ‘less inclined’ to seek 
union membership. Finally, management were confident they would encounter little union 
opposition to their decision. The predominant focus of the literature, however, has chiefly 
revolved around considering the extent to which multi-site employers concurrently operate 
some facilities on a unionised basis, and others on a non-union arrangement, and the 
propensity for unionised firms to constitute ‘greenfield’ sites on a union-free footing. As a 
result, much research on double-breasting has been concerned with identifying the incidence 
of such systems rather than what has actually occurred within them. Apart from quantitative 
data about spread and trajectory noted above, evidence is really only beginning to emerge on 
why double-breasting occurs in the first instance (see Gunnigle et al., 2005; Collings et al., 
2008).  
For example, recent research has inferred rationales for the existence of double-breasting 
amongst MNCs through regression analysis (Lamare et al., 2013). Thus, large firms with 
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multiple sites are likely to display double-breasted arrangements. Product heterogeneity 
(service delivery) and greater organisational de-centralisation may be linked to an increase in 
the incidence of double-breasting, insofar as employers are likely to use a wide range of 
employment arrangements to fit the demands of diverse products. Similarly, location within a 
firm’s production network or supply chain may impose increased pressure on cost and 
flexibility, with centralised control over Human Resource (HR) practices (Ferner and 
Almond, 2013), especially if one particular site is participating in upstream integration (i.e. 
supplying to other sites in the firm). Both intra- and inter-firm specific supply networks might 
encourage certain sites within an organisation to opt for non-union arrangements, particularly 
for the higher value-added activities such as research and development or new technological 
production investments. It can also suggest that the way employment relations actors respond 
to such pressures might not be deterministically uniform: subsidiary managers can often 
carve out spaces for enhanced autonomy, or in other situations central managers may set 
patterns of control over HR practice configurations with variation pointing to idiosyncratic 
adaptability (Belizon et al., 2013). Given the relatively underdeveloped state of knowledge as 
to why employers and especially MNC sites opt for double-breasting, it is appropriate to 
examine in greater detail  the rationales for the practice.  
Aside from limited evidence around rationale, a potentially more significant lacuna in the 
literature on double-breasting is that it remains largely silent on how it unfolds and playsout 
within an organisational context. Existing knowledge indicates that double-breasting appears 
to be amenable to survival where local customs or institutional arrangements are 
accommodating (Lavelle et al., 2010), or where it serves as a fundamental requisite of MNC 
policy abroad (Collings et al., 2008). Yet a substantive gap in knowledge is how double-
breasting unfolds at the organisational level. This might be in terms of how wider national 
institutional frameworks shape behaviour, the micro-political dynamics of the practice among 
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actors at workplace level (e.g. managers of different plants, employees, and unions), or the 
types of employment arrangements that actually characterise the process. Institutional context 
and the degree of latitude it offers employer discretion is likely to be important insofar as 
employee representation regimes are typically embedded or influenced by national 
institutional arrangements (Patmore, 2010). In the context of an Anglo-Saxon type 
voluntarism, for example, the evolution of double-breasted regimes may accord with wider 
institutional patterns of limited employment regulation and declining trade union density. 
Institutional differences between voluntarist economies can also impact double-breasting 
regimes: for example the existence of statutory trade union recognition legislation in the UK 
and its absence in the Republic of Ireland. Ultimately, as Lamare et al. (2013) observe, the 
problem with existing approaches on double-breasting has been the paucity of in-depth case 
studies in yielding a more comprehensive understanding of single firms’ or sets of firms’ 
practice over time, and that involve participation by multiple actors at different levels, 
including both headquarters and subsidiaries. 
There are also good reasons to suspect that the durability of double-breasting may be 
contingent on micro-political dynamics among employment relations actors. Studies of wage 
relativities, for example, suggest that workforce comparisons with like-groups can result in 
conflict should the former feel disadvantaged (Rowthorn, 1980). How perceived disparities in 
relativities manifest conflict can depend on the power and organisation of workers vis-à-vis 
their employing firm. For example, dissatisfaction with relativities may result in turnover or 
effort-shirking where workers experience non-union voice regimes (van den Broek and 
Dundon, 2012), or strikes and other forms of organised conflict where workers are unionised 
(Arestis and Skott, 1993). The existence of differences in union vs. non-union status at 
different plants in a single company may result in relative deprivation among non-union 
employees who view their union counterparts as enjoying superior representational systems. 
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This may engender perceptions of injustice which in turn trigger collective mobilisation 
amongst non-union workers (cf. Kelly, 1998). Gollan (2007) suggests that the durability of 
non-union arrangements might be contingent on whether employers match wages and 
conditions compared with unionised workplaces. For example, if the employer, in the non-
union plant, reduces wages and conditions (voluntarily or involuntarily) to a lower level than 
the unionised plants, this might create the condition for union activity. The durability of the 
non-union side of the double-breasting arrangement, and prospect for unionisation, might 
then be dependent on management approaches that match or exceed those of the union-based 
counterpart within the same firm (Gollan, 2007; Kaufman and Taras, 2000; Kaufman, 2013). 
The practice of double-breasting also poses challenges for unions as it not only diverts work 
to the non-union sector, but it also, if whipsawing is involved, places considerable pressure 
on unions to grant concessions so that the unionised plant will remain competitive. 
Historically in the US construction industry, unions responded to double-breasting through 
work-preservation clauses and arbitration, as well as unfair labour practice charges under the 
National Labour Relations Act, even though most of these proved ineffectual (Befort, 1987). 
The various responses of other organisational stakeholders, notably employees and trade 
unions, evidently necessitate closer scrutiny so as to consider how double-breasting ‘plays 
out’ in practice.  
In light of these issues, three core questions present themselves: i) what are employer 
motives for double-breasting; ii) what type of practices characterise the double-breasting 
arrangement; and iii) what, if any, are the micro-political implications of double-breasting. 
Taken together, these research questions contribute knowledge concerning the emergence, 
form and impact of double-breasting.   
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Methodology 
Research Design 
The data in this article is based on four multi-site case study organisations operating in 
both jurisdictions on the island of Ireland. As much research on double-breasting involves 
quantitative survey data reporting the incidence of practice, our research design supports the 
call for more comparative critical and in-depth case studies to explore the motives and power 
resource issues underpinning organisational practice (Ferner et al., 2011:182). The inclusion 
of cases from both sides of the Irish border also offers some institutional comparability. 
While the two jurisdictions of the Republic of Ireland (ROI) and Northern Ireland (NI) are 
broadly similar as voluntarist liberal market economies, there are differences of relevance. In 
particular, statutory trade union recognition legislation exists in NI, while in ROI union 
bargaining and recognition are wholly voluntary. In addition, both the UK (NI) and Irish 
governments decided to transpose employee voice regulations (aka the European Directive 
for employee information and consultation) differently, suggesting that the issues concerning 
institutional and cultural legacies, as Patmore (2010) notes, are potential important contextual 
conduits shaping the motive and dynamics of how voice arrangements are played out in 
practice. The multi-case study design ensured evidence from different contextual settings and 
economic sectors: telecommunications, construction supplies and conglomerates, public 
services, and catering and hospitality. 
 
Case Study Contexts 
BritCo is a former UK state monopoly that was privatised in the 1980s. The company now 
operates in more than 170 countries and entered the Irish market through a joint commercial 
venture with an Irish semi-state and another private-sector organisation, making it the second 
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largest employer in its sector in ROI, with over 2000 employees. Business objectives include 
a focussed plan of growth through acquisition in ROI, which led BritCo to purchase  some 
establishments which were non-unionised. These objectives were in stark contrast to the 
consolidation of business activities (rather than acquisition and growth) in NI, with a focus on 
maintaining established collective bargaining in union recognised sites in NI. Union density 
at BritCo in NI is over 90 per cent.  
ConcreteCo is headquartered in ROI with operations in 35 countries, employing over 
93,000 people worldwide, with 2200 people in Ireland. The company operates in the 
construction materials supply market, with its Northern Ireland division established through 
the acquisition of a number of smaller building merchants. Its core business objective is to 
support semi-autonomous independent trading units in bespoke areas of construction supply, 
conglomerates, and building materials outlets. Within ROI, ConcreteCo is a multi-union 
company with relatively high union density at around 80 per cent, while in NI ConcreteCo is 
non-unionised across all but one of its NI operations. The one unionised location in the North 
was the result of a prior union recognition agreement when ConcreteCo purchased the 
company.  
TourismCo is a public sector multi-site organisation. Its business objective is based on an 
all-Ireland remit established under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement (1998) to 
‘promote tourism, sport and leisure’. It is jointly managed by the Irish Government and 
Northern Ireland (Government) Executive. The majority of its 160 employees are based in 
key source locations such as America, Canada, France, Britain, Germany, Switzerland and 
Australia (among others). It works closely with two other public sector bodies to promote 
tourism — Failte Ireland and the Northern Irish Tourist Board. It is headquartered in two 
offices: one in Coleraine (NI) which is non-unionised employing about 40 staff, and a larger 
unionised Dublin (ROI) location employing 120 staff. Union density is around 13 per cent at 
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the unionised ROI office. In the North employees were previously represented by a public 
sector union.  
CateringCo is an American-owned MNC and is regarded as the market leader for 
‘business process outsourcing’ in Ireland, covering contract catering, site maintenance and 
facilities management services. Its Irish headquarters is in Dublin, with sites in most other 
cities in both NI and ROI. On the island of Ireland it employs over 3500 people in more than 
400 locations. CateringCo’s business objective is to be the leading outsourced catering and 
facilities management contractor in Ireland. It provides to client companies a range of 
outsource support services: catering, security, event management, corporate hospitality, and 
on-site maintenance facilities in a highly competitive and price-sensitive market. The 
research focussed on the catering division of the business. In both ROI and NI, workers are 
employed on a variety of temporary, fixed-term or zero-hours contracts, with relatively high 
staff turnover. CateringCo has a mix of union-recognition and non-union arrangements at 
different sites on the island of Ireland. The characteristics of the case material is summarised 
in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Data Collection 
To ensure triangulation, we based the identification and inclusion of the above four as 
suitable case studies on several criteria. First, we collected data from a spread of private and 
public and large and smaller organisations. Variability by firm size, sector, unionisation, 
occupational mix, and business objectives adds a wider scope for generalizability. Second, 
preliminary desk research identified organisations in the targeted sectors that, on face 
validity, had a double-breasting strategy. The principal data-collection instrument thereafter 
was semi-structured interviews with a total of 112 informants across 16 separate workplaces 
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(see Table 1).  We secured access initially through contact with the senior human resource 
professional in each organisation. On their agreement, we interviewed different informants in 
order to capture both factual and different subjective perspectives on double-breasting and 
employee voice practices. Respondents include site managers, workplace shop stewards, non-
union representatives and employees. We arranged follow-up contact with relevant external 
trade union officials where relevant.  
In addition, documentary information was available from each case which provided 
objective data on work practices and background information relating to numbers of 
employees, occupational classification and union recognition and/or non-recognition. For 
example, HR policies and personnel manuals provided a detailed overview of the types of 
voice practices formally available at union and non-union sites. Minutes from joint 
consultation and work council meetings held between management and union and non-union 
staff representatives provided data on the issues channelled through the voice system that 
existed at particular cases and sites. Examples included employee grievances, redundancy 
concerns, pay and bonus issues, overtime working, grading and performance appraisals 
(among others).     
 
Data Analysis  
The analysis of data followed protocols appropriate to our case study design, suggested by 
Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2009). Interview transcripts accounted for the bulk of our data. 
We followed a coding protocol consistent with the core research questions and themes 
presented in the previous section: employer motives for particular voice schema at separate 
sites; variable site-level autonomy and/or conformity to corporate policy; the characteristic of 
actual double-breasted voice practices at worksite level; the subjective interpretations of 
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actors as to the processes and power dynamics affecting double-breasting; and issues of 
contestation and tension. In addition to interview data analysis, we used content analysis to 
examine documentary material. For example, we coded documents in relation to formal voice 
policy, and contrasted that with processes and practices from interview data. Further coding 
helped categorise union and non-union policy by company site and location. Finally, 
documentary analysis identified a range of employee grievances and tensions, as reported in 
works council and union meeting minutes. The latter gave additional data on possible 
contestation that the researchers used iteratively with key informants during the semi-
structured interview approach. Overall, all members of the research team checked and cross-
referenced the coding of both interview reports and documentary results during and after the 
fieldwork to ensure reliability, accuracy, and consistency of interpretation and analysis.  
 
Findings 
This section presents the case evidence thematically in relation to the three core research 
questions concerning: i) the emergence of and motives for double-breasting; ii) the voice 
practices that characterise double-breasting; and iii), the micro-politics of double-breasting. 
 
I. The emergence of and motives for double-breasting 
The motives for double-breasting voice included a mix of factors. For example, double-
breasting at BritCo derived from corporate decision-making at the UK headquarters 
concerning strategies for expansion into the ROI market. The objective was to secure market 
share in light of Irish government plans to de-regulate the state-monopolised product market. 
Entry first found expression in a joint commercial venture with the state company prior to 
privatisation, progressing to BritCo, post-deregulation, acquiring the joint venture as well as 
another new indigenous entrant into the market. Both acquisitions had been non-union. In 
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light of the expanding scale of operations in ROI (principally located in Dublin), the close 
proximity of managerial and technical skills in NI (principally located in Belfast) and the 
desire to avoid duplication, UK headquarters sought greater streamlining of activities within 
BritCo operations across the two jurisdictions. This resulted in one overarching 
organisational unit, called ‘BritCo Ireland’. Double-breasting emanated from this merger: it 
inherited the legacy of high union density plants in NI and newer, non-union operations in 
ROI.  
However, unlike other theoretical propositions (Dundon, 2002; Gall, 2004), union 
avoidance was not the main or key single motivator for double-breasting voice in this 
context. Indeed, the employer viewed the unionised side of the double-breasted arrangements 
in NI positively, but at the same time saw the expansion of BritCo in ROI through acquisition 
as opening up new opportunities in the design of non-union voice, or an opportunity to 
consolidate existing non-union arrangements in acquired subsidiaries. Where the union 
avoidance sentiment (and counter-mobilisation) occurred in BritCo ROI, unions challenged 
evidence of non-unionism (sub-section III below considers this dynamic).  
Likewise, the emergence of double-breasting at CateringCo was associated with business 
objectives to be the leading catering and facilities management sub-contractor on the island 
of Ireland. CateringCo headquarters, based in the United States, favoured non-union 
employment relations on the grounds of labour contract flexibility and an ideological 
espousal of individualist employment relationships. Despite headquarter preferences for non-
unionism, there was considerable local variation, with half of its subsidiaries in ROI, and all 
but one in NI, operating on a non-union basis. Unionisation existed in some ROI sites, partly 
as an inherited legacy from commercial acquisition of unionised companies, and partly the 
result of a union organising campaign by a leading general union. In ROI, double-breasting in 
CateringCo was at times a pragmatic adaptation to localised customs that reflected a 
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market/client-driven rationale; what might be termed ‘reverse double-breasting’, insofar as it 
exemplified a non-union employer occasionally recognising unions in new sites, leading to a 
patchwork of union and non-union arrangements across different client establishments. To 
this end double-breasting displayed mimic isomorphic features, as CateringCo units sought to 
mirror the employment relations architecture that existed within client plants. Local managers 
explained that this allowed CateringCo to demonstrate a cultural synergy between its own 
systems and the policies and practices of the client organisation. In part, the approach was 
influenced by the client firms, some of which informed CateringCo site management of the 
desirability for non-union arrangements, while others, particularly clients in the public sector, 
could accommodate union recognition. The HR manager for CateringCo Ireland summed this 
up as “going with the flow” in replicating known client practices. Local management 
knowledge about the existence of a unionised relationship within a client organisation was 
therefore important to the decision about union or non-union voice options. One exception to 
this illustrates the unevenness and complexity of double-breasting as it unfolded across 
multiple locations of this company. At one large US MNC client, well-known for its non-
union status, CateringCo employees joined a union and obtained conditional recognition from 
management. CateringCo management reluctantly conceded union recognition despite the 
client’s strong non-union preferences. The site manager explained that recognition was given 
but on condition that subsequent union-management interactions would be kept as informal 
as possible to downplay the union’s role at the client site. For example there was no union 
committee, no facilities provided to the shop steward on the client’s premises and any 
discussions with management had to take place off site. The manager explained: 
[client firm’s name] line is if an employee needs a union then they are 
not doing a good enough job …. given [client firm’s] non-union stance 
meetings with the union are off-site. 
(Site Manager, CateringCo ROI) 
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The emergence of double-breasting at ConcreteCo revolved around a purposely 
decentralised managerial arrangement that encouraged a high degree of latitude in which 
local managers tailored voice schemes according to particular customs and practices at each 
site. The organisation’s Code of Conduct document stipulated that: “each operating company 
is responsible for managing all aspects of its own employee relations e.g. pay, pensions, 
hours of work, local code of conduct, agreements with unions” and that employment relations 
policy “should be in accordance with the local legislation and custom and practice”. This 
strategy for plant management autonomy resulted in a patchwork of unionised and non-
unionised sites being run in tandem. The vast majority of ConcreteCo sites in the ROI, for 
example, are unionised and, indeed, multi-unionism prevailed at several locations: 
construction had been a strong growth area for union density since the mid-1990s. 
Unionisation was seen by ROI managers as a normal feature of employment relations and 
senior management at headquarters level espoused a ‘partnership’ approach with unions.  In 
contrast, operations in NI were run on an almost entirely non-union basis, although again 
some exceptions existed because of either legacy issues owing to acquisition or determined 
by local management preferences with unionisation in a minority of sites. Unlike ROI, an 
ideological hostility to unionisation was present amongst some senior management in NI and 
there was a deliberate objective to keep sites union-free insofar as possible. 
Double-breasting at TourismCo emerged in a somewhat unique way, in that the key 
driving force was employees themselves, owing to growing dissatisfaction with existing 
union channels of representation. In NI, employees opted-out of the formal joint negotiating 
machinery and union membership. The primary reason appeared to be a growing pay gap that 
favoured employees in ROI. Through national partnership agreements in ROI, employees 
obtained a 40 per cent pay rise over 10 years, compared to a 10 per cent rise for workers in 
NI over the same timeframe. Although the relevant NI union initially sought pay parity, the 
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employer refused on the grounds it would break unified civil service pay grades negotiated as 
particular to a sovereign state with its own institutional employment relations system. 
Employees in NI reported considerable dissatisfaction with the union’s inability to address 
the relative disparity in pay between workers of the same organisation and of the same job 
grade, but who worked to different political and jurisdictional rules. The result was a union 
membership refusing to renew subscriptions. One NI employee, and former shop steward, 
remarked: 
The union did not want to pursue our parity pay claim and only did so half-
heartedly … there is no point in staying in a union that would not act for its 
members 
(Employee and former Union Steward, TourismCo NI) 
 
In summary, in three of the four cases (BritCo, CateringCo and ConcreteCo), the 
overriding motive for double-breasting was a by-product of business objectives related to 
subsidiary expansion and/or contraction with attendant non-union arrangements diffused, or 
unionised voice tolerated. Local management preferences at site level proved important in 
producing this patchwork of arrangements. In TourismCo the origin of double-breasting was 
not managerially driven at all, but emanated from employee influences. Overall, however, 
double-breasting motives were thus mostly emergent and ad-hoc, rather than strategic and 
pre-planned.  
 
II. The institutional characteristics of double-breasting 
The type of voice arrangements which characterised double-breasting varied in relation to 
the factors and motives detailed above, typically including direct (individualised) and indirect 
(collective) practices in both the unionised and non-union work locations. Of broader 
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significance, reported next, are spill-over and legacy issues from the unionised sites affecting 
behaviours at non-union plants. 
At ConcreteCo unionised voice arrangements (in ROI) operated at national and local 
levels. National-level structures dealt with negotiation and consultative issues although they 
were typically ad-hoc and issue-driven. At local level union negotiating arrangements 
focussed on operational issues such as redundancies, working time and/or problems arising in 
quarries. Despite established formal bargaining structures, collective negotiation as the 
dominant mode of interaction between union representatives and employers was in decline. It 
was evident that collective bargaining had progressively withered over the years and been 
replaced by consultation, or the simple provision of information. Union stewards regularly 
complained that management plans were mostly presented as a fait accompli: 
You get the sense that decisions are already made at a higher level, then the unions 
are told. Unions don’t have real influence, say if new machinery or work practices 
come in. There is no real participation. 
(ConcreteCo Union Steward, Southern Ireland) 
 
Illustrative of this was the process of restructuring and amalgamation of three Southern 
ConcreteCo companies into one in 2009. Although management advanced that substantial 
consultation occurred over the transfer of undertakings, a conflicting view was offered by 
union representatives: “there was no union consultation whatsoever, no negotiation of the 
ConcreteCo consolidation”. Whilst union representatives were conscious of a progressive 
narrowing of their capacity to affect substantive and procedural matters, influence over the 
‘allocation, timing and distribution’ of workforce redundancies was an area that remained 
resilient and not insignificant for the workers concerned. But the strength of union structures 
in the Republic were being eroded with a new greenfield administrative centre established in 
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ConcreteCo in 2009. The majority of staff were unionised, although new hires were placed on 
inferior terms and conditions than those in comparable sites in ROI: working time was 
extended by 2.5 hours and new work practices were implemented without union negotiation 
or consultation.  
At the NI plants, non-union voice arrangements prevailed through both individual and 
collective fora. Predominantly, employees raised issues with local managers on an individual 
basis, although a works committee existed in some sites tailored to specific issues including 
production, health and safety, and collective workforce grievances. However, these works 
committees remained haphazard with no coherent election or nomination scheme, and 
employee representatives ‘handpicked’ by management. The NI HR manager explained that 
employees were expected to first engage with their own manager on a one-to-one basis, 
rather than utilise the committees. For example: 
Not all divisions have a works committee. It’s not a set arrangement. 
Whether it exists or not could be due to demand, or tradition, or because it 
is seen as a good idea by management. Each division is different in terms 
of how they communicate and consult”        (HR Manager, ConcreteCo NI) 
 
The character of double-breasting voice at BritCo reflected union marginalisation, even in 
those sites with a long-standing tradition of collective bargaining. In unionised plants, joint 
consultative committees met twice a year in NI and these were complemented by monthly 
site-wide meetings. These latter meetings were predominately managerially-led and 
consultative in orientation. Indeed union representatives in NI tended to highlight a growing 
marginalisation within the company and an evident lack of power to influence managerial 
decision-making. Concession bargaining and give-backs to management had been a dominant 
feature of management-union relations in NI since the recession. Consequently, union 
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representatives regarded their role as mostly consultative and as ‘sounding boards’ for 
managerial initiatives. As one union representative summarised: 
Do we have any influence on management? Honest truth? Very little … 
any changes we have been making or any gains we’ve made for our 
members has been small. It’s going to be implemented nearly to the letter 
of what we first received. 
(Union Shop Steward, BritCo NI) 
 
The voice arrangements at non-union ROI sites were noticeably absent, aside from 
occasional team briefings. However, in pre-empting institutional regulations for European-
wide worker rights for company information and consultation, management established a new 
non-union employee representation (NER) forum. Following the regulatory push for 
employee voice, the NER forum was further promoted by management in response to a union 
organising campaign at the non-union plants in ROI. As a result, a re-constituted NER forum 
subsequently became the centrepiece of the firm’s voice practices in the Republic [discussed 
below in III].  
  In CateringCo, the voice arrangements almost universally gravitated towards direct and 
informal communications. This was true even in unionised sites where shop stewards were 
present. Union committee meetings for example were largely absent. There was no collective 
bargaining at local site level, and wages and conditions were set by national (head office) 
management. As such, union representation at site level was heavily dependent on the 
commitment of the shop steward. Union respondents explained that they struggled to 
maintain union status, as local managers changed on such a regular basis that replacement 
managers would have to be reminded that union recognition existed at these sites. Indeed the 
pattern of shallow voice arrangements observed to prevail in the non-union plants, such as 
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notice boards, team-briefings and informal face-to-face dialogue, was typically replicated in 
the formally unionised sites. 
Finally, TourismCo also exhibited some broader variation in terms of voice practices 
deployed across its double-breasted sites. Within the unionised site in Dublin, an indirect 
representative forum, the Joint Negotiating and Consultative Committee (JNCC), met four 
times a year. The JNCC did not deal with pay negotiating issues, which were addressed at 
national level in line with other public sector employments. Aside from the JNCC, the 
employer had a wide range of direct information and consultation mechanisms in the 
unionised site, mostly concerned with providing top-down communications from 
management to employees. Relative to the JNCC, these latter mechanisms tended to be more 
to the fore of how employees claimed to experience voice in ROI, indeed few employees 
participating in the study were aware of the JNCC. Union membership in ROI was low at 13 
per cent (compared to 70 per cent density in the Irish public sector as a whole). In NI, having 
resigned membership of the union, employees did not participate on any representative 
forum, and relied on direct information and communication mechanisms, typically email and 
team briefings. 
In summary, the institutional characteristics of double-breasted voice systems across the 
cases point to two key features. First, despite the formal union/non-union divide between 
double-breasted sites, in all four cases the unionised sites appeared to increasingly confine the 
unions’ influence to information and consultative structures. Bargaining in the unionised sites 
of BritCo and ConcreteCo had been subject to marginalisation, and at CateringCo union 
status remained fragile and prone to erosion and managerial by-passing. In TourismCo, the 
union remained marginal to decision-making with voice captured by a range of employer-
driven direct information practices. Secondly, whilst the institutional characteristics of non-
union voice in the union-free plants evidenced a patchwork of different approaches, apart 
from the deliberate NER in BritCo, the arrangements remained ad-hoc and predominantly 
individualist and informal in design. 
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III. The micro-political dynamics and potential durability of double-breasting voice 
In this section, we consider how double-breasting ‘played out’ across the respective 
organisational contexts. An important contribution in this regard includes the dynamic of 
employees themselves as key agents of change and contestation, along with the impact of 
double-breasting voice on union organisation within the firm. 
The streamlining of business operations into a single unit of BritCo Ireland, and the 
resulting double-breasted characteristics of employee voice, proved to be a contentious 
dynamic at non-union plants in ROI. In particular, workers in ROI believed that staff in NI 
enjoyed superior terms and conditions of employment because of their exclusive union 
bargaining conditions. Such perceptions hardened when they realised that redundancy was 
dealt with in an entirely different way in each particular double-breasted site. In NI unionised 
sites, there existed a negotiated ‘no compulsory redundancy’ agreement, but there was no 
comparable protection for non-union workers at ROI plants. Employee awareness of the 
apparent union mark-up conferred on unionised workers stemmed from increasing interaction 
between the Belfast (unionised) and Dublin (non-union) sites that evolved from the 
integration of an all-Ireland business objective. For example, project teams and training days 
facilitated a degree of informal information-sharing and ‘spill-over’ between (unionised) 
engineers in NI and their (non-unionised) counterparts in ROI: the former enjoying a 
collectively-negotiated work pattern with shift premium and defined start and finish times, 
whereas those engineers under the non-union regime had to be more flexible and work 
‘beyond their scheduled hours’ to finish a job. 
The unfolding of these double-breasting issues at BritCo engendered a growing sense of 
injustice. This led to a union organising drive in one of the non-union plants in ROI, which 
subsequently spread to another (call centre operation) non-union site. Refusal by management 
to recognise the union at the non-union locations in ROI, while actively supporting collective 
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bargaining in NI, prompted a union campaign targeting specifically BritCo’s double-
breasting arrangement as ‘anti-union’. The union president remarked: 
It seems under the [BritCo] business model they will treat all of their 
customers the same but discriminate against you if you work for them in 
the Republic of Ireland.  We now have the ridiculous situation that if you 
are one inch on one side of the border BritCo will recognise your right to 
be represented by a Union but if you are an inch on the other side of the 
border it will discriminate against you.   
(President, Sectoral Union) 
 
In response, management re-constituted the previously defunct NER forum noted in II 
above, initially designed to meet the regulatory requirements of European regulations for 
employee information and consultation. The re-vamped NER, renamed ‘BritCo Vocal’, was 
now promoted as an active engine for change with meetings planned every four weeks, 
including employee representatives from across all grades of staff in non-union sites. The 
hot-beds of union activity were each allowed three non-union representatives. In addition, the 
items open for consultation were extended in scope and included claims for parity of 
redundancy conditions between union (NI) and non-union (ROI) plants, employee input into 
a new staff handbook of HR rules and procedures, and a series of other employee grievances. 
The employee representatives on the BritCo NER forum achieved a number of concessions 
by drawing comparisons between the redundancy terms in the unionised NI and those in the 
non-union ROI sites. While management refused to extend the no compulsory redundancy 
agreement to non-union plants, significant increases were made to the redundancy terms for 
employees in these parallel non-union plants. The union substitution tactics of the NER 
forum, complemented by the employer’s steadfast determination to refuse recognition in non-
union plants in ROI, were partially successful in undermining the momentum of the union 
recognition campaign. The union was unable to secure recognition, pointing to a lack of 
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statutory support in ROI relative to the legislation available to workers in NI. Similarly, 
BritCo senior management positively commented on the permissive context as an enabling 
force in their desire to maintain union-free plants. By the conclusion of the field research, the 
union had nonetheless managed to expand its density at the non-union plants to roughly 30 
per cent of the workforce. However, the employer remained wedded to a double-breasted 
model.  
At ConcreteCo, perceived relativities regarding the double-breasting practice in NI proved 
contentious and mirrored in part a whipsawing approach. In NI, workers within unionised 
plants saw the creation of new non-union sites as a threat and held the view that union 
members were ‘under-siege’ from a regional management determined to undermine 
unionised conditions. Yet the unions perceived themselves as too weak to counter 
management’s decision to create parallel non-union arrangements, citing low membership, 
high unemployment and employer capacity for emasculating union strength. In one 
(acquired) unionised plant, local NI managers decided to de-recognise the union. In this and 
one other non-union plant, workers were informed that both sites would be closed, with 
production moving to a new greenfield (non-union) facility. Workers in both plants were 
offered redundancy, or the option of applying for a job at the new greenfield site. 
Furthermore, workers in the greenfield site would have to accept a new contract of 
employment as well as terms and conditions that were lower than was the case in the former 
unionised plant, such as customary bonus payments. One employee, from the former 
unionised site in the NI, brought a legal claim against the company which sought to preserve 
union recognition and collective bargaining pay norms. The claim was lost. Such issues are 
highly insightful in exhibiting the micro-politics and dynamics surrounding the unfolding of 
double-breasting and the nuances of actions that play one group of workers, typically 
unionised, off against another group at a non-union location. Senior management in 
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ConcreteCo NI were particularly aware of the flexibility afforded to them by virtue of union 
absence and dismissal of union power. Issues regarding redundancy and reducing working 
hours were now easier for management to execute. Indeed, some managers at union-
recognised plants in ROI spoke with admiration about how their non-union (NI) managerial 
counterparts could close a site and displace a workforce with relative ease; in one instance in 
less than six weeks. When NI management closed down the aforementioned unionised site it 
had acquired, where three unions were present, the process was felt by management to be 
more complicated because of collective representation: 
“Their [union-negotiated] contract of employment is miles away from the 
contract of employment that we have [in non-union sites], because of...the 
consultation with trade unions. They write everything in their contract of 
employment … Criminal from an employer perspective. You couldn’t 
temporarily lay people off without a change to the contract of 
employment,...Their [unionised] contract is six pages. [The non-union] 
contract is two”.                                             (HR Manager, ConcreteCo NI) 
 
Finally, and in contrast to the high degree of contention that unfolded around double-
breasting at BritCo and to a lesser extent ConcreteCo, the micro-politics at both CateringCo 
and TourismCo remained largely uncontroversial amongst employees and unions, with a 
resultant deeper durability to the reported practices. In CateringCo this appeared to be related 
to localised self-management of separate individual sites, many of which operated largely 
without reference to each other. Consequently, employees at the various non-union plants 
were typically unaware of the employment arrangements at other (unionised) sites. Added to 
a high level of staff turnover generally, and the prevalence of transient foreign labour and 
zero-hour contracts, the issue of double-breasting faced little if any challenge from unions or 
employees. With a global corporate culture espousing the virtues of individualism, shop 
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stewards remained concerned with holding their position within their own site rather than 
looking to mobilise membership resources elsewhere. Of greater consequence for the 
unfolding of double-breasting arrangements at different CateringCo sites was the high degree 
of localised management latitude in determining whether union or non-union status prevailed, 
but once this decision was made the practice was a fait accompli. Similarly, double-breasting 
unfolded in a relatively unproblematic manner at TourismCo, although the eventual regime 
was driven by employee concerns regarding pay parity and dissatisfaction with union 
representation rather than employer objectives per se. A preference for individualised 
communications and non-union voice in NI reflected a different dynamic among worker 
attitudes. For example, younger employees who were recruited directly from the labour 
market rather than being transferred from other public services entered the company with a 
different mind-set towards unionisation. These younger employee respondents spoke of a 
positive ‘corporate culture’ and felt management satisfactorily addressed worker concerns 
without the need for union representation. Combined with the pay parity issue and changing 
employee attitudes that favoured more individualised HR practices, union voice diminished 
and withered away in the North.   
In summary, how double-breasting ‘plays out’ across the case studies provides two main 
lessons. Double-breasting was perceived by employees to be unfavourable to their 
employment status and was actively contested at BritCo and ConcreteCo, albeit to different 
degrees. In CateringCo and TourismCo, however, the practice of double-breasting went 
largely unchallenged. The existence of employee knowledge shared across sites engendered a 
perception of relative deprivation among a dispersed workforce which, in turn, led to the 
mobilisation of opposition and a challenge to the durability of double-breasting, in BritCo 
and ConcreteCo. The absence of these dynamics in CateringCo and TourismCo ensured that 
double-breasting arrangements remained much more durable. 
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Discussion 
The findings presented above both confirm and, significantly, go beyond existing 
knowledge on double-breasted voice regimes. In demonstrating this, we discuss the three core 
research questions posed earlier in light of the above evidence: what are the motives for 
double-breasting; what practices characterise the double-breasting arrangement; and what, if 
any, are the micro-political implications of double-breasting.  
Considering the matter of motives and emergence, the literature to date has tended to point 
scholarship in two competing directions. First, the ‘deliberate-sequentiality’ idea positions 
double-breasting as a deliberate strategic ploy to whipsaw (older) unionised sites against 
(newer) non-unionised locations (Northrup, 1995). A second direction saw double-breasting 
as less strategic, and could include those sites where unionised firms acquired non-unionised 
sites with particular business objectives of growth through either greenfield expansion or 
brownfield acquisition (Beaumont and Harris, 1992; Collings et al., 2008). The data from the 
cases presented in this article is broadly consistent with the latter, which we term the 
‘emergence through expansion’ thesis. For example, at BritCo, CateringCo and ConcreteCo 
double-breasting emerged as a by-product of firm expansion and acquisition. Whilst the 
evidence supports the view of double-breasting as less strategic, the findings also 
demonstrate various important firm-level contingencies in explaining how double-breasting 
emerged. Uneven mixtures of corporate decision-making and site-level management 
autonomy are crucial variables in explaining double-breasting in BritCo, CateringCo and 
ConcreteCo. Site-level management autonomy was pronounced in shaping the patchwork of 
arrangements that emerged and from which, in the majority of instances, pragmatic 
considerations vis-à-vis union status held sway. Accommodating inherited legacies (BritCo 
and ConcreteCo) and pragmatically assuaging clients (CateringCo) therefore patterned site-
level management behaviour. This supports the position that in managing employment 
relations, employers will tend to maintain status quo arrangements rather than jeopardise 
equilibriums or undertake path-breaking initiatives (Pierson, 2000). Importantly, with 
employment relations being of a second- or third-order concern, factors sustaining or 
expanding firm profitability will tend to dominate (Boxall and Purcell, 2011). As a result, 
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double-breasting and wider employment relations issues tend to be ‘muddled through’ 
(Sisson, 1995) when, and as, they arise. Such a tendency can also explain why union 
encroachments were resisted in some of the non-union sites across the case companies: 
managers managing without unions tend to prefer remaining non-union unless coerced to do 
otherwise (Dundon and Rollinson, 2004). Finally, on the matter of motives and emergence, it 
is noteworthy that TourismCo did not fit neatly into either the ‘deliberate-sequentiality’ or 
‘emergence through expansion’ theses. It represents something of an anomaly whereby 
double-breasting emerged due to workers withdrawing support from the union in an 
otherwise unionised company: a sort of ‘reverse’ double-breasting that was not employer-
driven per se, but shaped in part by workers themselves.  
Second, in terms of voice practices that characterise double-breasting, differences that 
might be expected between union and non-union sites did exist in all cases. Indirect and 
collective voice schemes were features of union sites and, unsurprisingly, these tended to be 
less prevalent in non-unionised counterparts. However, dissimilarities were noticeably absent 
in CateringCo with a convergence of informal and direct voice being the norm across sites, 
regardless of union or non-union status. Of note is that whilst indirect (collective) union-led 
representation existed in the unionised plants of BritCo NI, ConcreteCo ROI and TourismCo 
ROI, these co-existed with, and in some cases were challenged by, an array of employer-
driven direct (individual) schemes for information and communication that straddled both 
non-union and unionised sites. Similarly, pressures on the potency of union-based 
arrangements did exist, caused mostly by a general employer power enabled by conditions of 
recession. In unionised sites of BritCo and ConcreteCo, unions reported tactics of being side-
lined and being subject to downward communication in a general context of ‘give back’ 
concessions. Similarly, unions in TourismCo operated somewhat at the margins of a 
managerially-driven system of information and consultation. This suggests that even in 
formally unionised sites, the risk of ‘hollow-shell’ representation ran large in an environment 
of union weakness. The presence of formal union recognition is thus not an indicator of the 
robustness of union channels, and more detailed and nuanced qualitative interpretations can 
enhance understanding of the character of double-breasting practices over time and space.  
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Third, the ‘micro-political’ implication of double-breasting was especially significant in 
advancing what can be labelled the ‘spill-over effect’ thesis. A key issue relates to cross-site 
comparability and the generation of perceptions of unfairness, injustice and inequity. Evident 
across all four cases are networks which enable comparisons between sites, or the lack 
thereof, which affected the durability of double-breasted voice arrangements. In BritCo, with 
its unitary cross-border structure, and staff interaction across the different union and non-
union sites, instability emerged in the double-breasted arrangement. In turn, the employer 
tried to minimise this instability by re-asserting and formalising union-substitution techniques 
in non-union plants. The interesting, if somewhat potentially unusual case of reverse double-
breasting at TourismCo, was similarly brought about by a ‘spill-over’ dynamic. The direction 
of comparison in TourismCo, however, ran unfavourably from union to non-union rather than 
non-union to union, as it did in BritCo. In CateringCo ‘spill-over’ did not take place. Sites 
operated with autonomy and without reference to each other, with employees ignorant of the 
voice arrangements at other plants. In ConcreteCo, sites also displayed the relatively 
autonomous and independent organisational structure, although in NI, workers in unionised 
sites were aware of, but unable to challenge, due to inadequate power, double-breasted 
arrangements. These findings indicate that the durability of double-breasting will tend to be 
challenged where there is cross-site interaction between workers themselves; where 
perceptions of injustice and/or relative deprivation emerge; and when employees can 
mobilise the resources to challenge double-breasted arrangements. Where such interactions, 
perceptions and (crucially) mobilising resources are absent, double-breasting will be more 
durable. A further implication of the open-ended element to the micro-politics of double-
breasting suggests that the arrangement need not be entirely treated as a one-way street with 
regard to union marginalisation. Depending on the particular mix of context, institutional 
arrangements and managerial motives, double-breasting may in fact be conducive to 
stimulating unionisation as much as it can result in its erosion within a firm. Depending on 
the prevailing context, is it is not inevitable that double-breasting voice will result in union 
substitution per se. As a summary overview, the core findings and case context factors are 
presented in Table 2. 
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TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
As with many case study approaches there are limitations. One caution is whilst cross-
sector variability can aid greater comparability, it can also miss out sector-specific influences 
which might be important in shaping outcomes. The methodological focus on events at a 
single moment in time can also limit the extent of generalizability to contexts. A further 
limitation is that as trade unions can adopt heterogeneous voice strategies with multiple 
employers, the experience of double-breasting at one union plant may not transfer to a 
different type in other settings, say general or craft union systems. However such limitations 
should be balanced by recognition that the research design was robust to capture intent, 
employer motive and build theoretical and explanatory power, not measure prevalence. In 
short, the research is about understanding a given social phenomenon and explaining the 
processes shaping double-breasting.  
Taken together, the findings and subsequent discussion contribute two new theoretical 
propositions on the ‘motives’ and ‘durability-contestation’ of double-breasting that advance 
knowledge and offer a template for future testing in research. First, concerning motives for 
double-breasting, the evidence advances the ‘emergence through expansion’ proposition: this 
maintains that ‘emergence through expansion’ logic is likely to populate cases of double-
breasting motives given that firm expansion across sites is driven by first-order concerns of 
profitability and growth rather than second- or third-order concerns on union status and 
employment relations. In other words ‘emergence through expansion’, and not ‘deliberate 
sequentiality’, will tend to be the primary motive for double-breasting regimes in firms. This 
proposition offers important insights for future researchers and policy makers concerned with 
employer motives for double-breasting voice in other national and multinational contexts.  
Second, evidence relating to the limited durability and potential contestation of double-
breasting advances a ‘spill-over effect’ proposition, drawn from analysis concerning the 
unfolding of practices and the micro-political dynamics of the cases. In other words ‘double-
breasting will tend to be contested by employees where there is: (a) cross-site interaction 
between union and non-union employees; (b) perceptions of relative deprivation among 
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employees(unions); and (c), the resources to mobilise employees (unions) to challenge the 
arrangement. These two propositions, generated from the case data, provide hypothetical 
frameworks for future research on double-breasting.  
 
Conclusion 
This article contributes to the growing phenomenon of double-breasting employment 
relations and employee voice in a number of ways. First, it advances multiple motives and 
various employer rationales for double-breasting. In particular, corporate business objectives 
and degrees of site management autonomy offer support for the ‘emergence through 
expansion’ thesis. This advances knowledge that the motives for double-breasting are more 
than static binaries around union substitution and/or suppression. Second, using a qualitative 
comparative case study methodology, we are able to complement quantitative studies by 
offering a deep and rich analysis of actor intentions and behaviours at the workplace. The 
unfolding of employer, union and employee actions can shape the institutional character of 
employee voice under double-breasted workplace regimes. Third, the micro-politics of 
double-breasting advances a ‘spill-over effect’ thesis, predicating that contestation rather than 
embedded durability is a likely outcome of double-breasting arrangements under certain 
conditions. Importantly, these propositions allow for future researchers to add to, refine and 
develop theory. As previously noted in the discussion, the limitations of the study included 
the small number of cases that may restrict generalizability. Future research offers great 
potential to add to, test, and expand the theoretical propositions advanced in this article from 
more longitudinal and sector-specific studies.    
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Table 1: Case Study Organisations 
Case Sector N Sites NI N Sites ROI N Respondents 
BritCo  Service & Manufacturing 
(telecommunications) 
1 2 6 managers 
3 union officials 
4 non-union reps 
13 employees 
n=26 
 
CateringCo Hospitality 
(catering & hospitality) 
3 4 17 managers 
3 union reps 
27 employees 
n=47 
ConcreteCo Manufacturing 
(construction conglomerates) 
1 3 8 managers 
3 union reps 
1 EWC rep 
8 employees 
n= 20 
 
TourismCo.  Services 
(leisure; public sector) 
 
1 1 6 managers 
3 union reps 
10 employees 
n=19 
 
     16 site locations total n = 112 
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Table 2: Summary of research findings by case 
 Cases 
 BritCo 
 
CateringCo ConcreteCo TourismCo 
 
Emergence of/motives for double-
breasting 
 
Double-breasting emerges from post-
merger inherited legacy 
 
Senior management express 
preference for non-unionism where 
possible.  
 
Double-breasting emerges from post-
acquisition inherited legacies; in 
some sites driven by client relations 
 
Senior management express 
preference for non-unionism  
 
Double-breasting determined by 
local management preferences.  
 
Senior management express 
preference for ‘union partnership’ in 
ROI; senior management express 
preference for non-unionism in NI  
 
 
Double-breasting emerges from 
employee dissatisfaction 
with/withdrawal from union in NI 
 
Senior management express 
preference for ‘union partnership’ 
 
 
Institutional characteristics of 
double-breasting 
 
 
 
Voice in non-union sites 
characterised by non-union employee 
representation and management-led 
communications 
 
Union-led collective voice prevalent 
in unionised sites; evidence of 
weakening union influence in 
unionised sites; consultation rather 
than negotiation dominating 
 
 
Voice in non-union sites 
characterised by informal one-to-
ones and management-led 
communication 
 
Voice in unionised sites replicate 
non-union sites; union structures 
weak in recognised sites; union 
representatives often by-passed 
 
 
Voice in non-union sites 
characterised by informal one-to-
ones and management-led 
communication; Representative 
committees for specific operational 
issues (production, health and safety) 
 
Union-led collective voice prevalent 
in unionised sites; evidence of 
weakening union  influence in 
unionised sites; consultation rather 
than negotiation dominating  
 
 
 
Voice in non-union site characterised 
by informal one-to-ones and 
management-led communication 
 
 
Mixture of union-led collective 
voice, informal one-to-ones and 
management led-communication in 
unionised site 
 
Micro-political implications of 
double-breasting  
 
Double-breasting challenged by 
employees; challenge driven by 
awareness of double-breasted 
practices and perceived inequity; 
management reform voice 
arrangements in non-union sites in 
response 
 
 
Double-breasting unchallenged by 
employees; employees unaware of 
voice arrangements/union status in 
other sites and/or low level of union 
demand 
 
Double-breasting unchallenged by 
employees; employees aware of 
double-breasted sites in NI and ROI 
but lack of power to challenge 
management preferences 
 
Double-breasting emerges from 
employees resigning from union in 
NI;  employees in non-union site 
satisfied with non-union voice  
 
